Abstract. This paper explores the compatibility of Luce Irigaray's recent insistence on the need to revalue nature, and to recognise culture's natural roots, with her earlier advocacy of social transformation towards a culture of sexual difference. Prima facie, there is tension between Irigaray's political imperatives, for if culture really is continuous with nature, this implies that our existing, non-sexuate, culture is naturally grounded and unchallengeable. To dissolve this tension, Irigaray must conceive culture as having self-transformative agency without positioning culture as active vis-à-vis an inert and passive nature. I argue that Irigaray achieves this by conceiving culture to arise from a division internal to nature. She derives this idea from Hölderlin, who claims that nature originally divides itself into subjects and objects, and from Heidegger, who maintains that nature inflicts an originary violence upon itself. Critically reworking Hölderlin and Heidegger, Irigaray argues that male nature tends to turn against itself to generate an anti-natural, ecologically destructive, culture. She argues, however, that this tendency can be redirected and alleviated by the very cultural resources which male nature generates in dividing itself. Irigaray thus develops a unique way to advocate social change while recognising nature's profound impact and influence upon culture.
3 antithesis, suggesting that, although culture has a natural basis, nature is always already cultural too.
For instance, Elizabeth Grosz argues that feminists should neither ignore nature nor treat it as a blank slate for cultural inscriptions, but examine how culture and nature intertwine. 4 She suggests that nature sets limits to cultural possibilities, and that nature consists of multiple tendencies and potentialities, which cultures can develop in variable ways (VB, 187, 191) . Grosz takes etching as a model for this process of cultural development, since etching must 'take into account the specificities of the materials … being inscribed and their concrete effects in the kind of text produced' (VB, 191 ). Yet Grosz goes on to deny that nature has any determinate character prior to cultural development. She claims that the natural limits to culture are malleable, because nature's potentialities are not given prior to culture but produced through cultural processes (VB, 188, 227). Ultimately, then, Grosz believes that culture interacts only with a nature that is already a cultural artefact.
In this way, she continues to privilege culture over nature, identifying culture as the ontologically basic reality, from which nature derives. 5 A more ambiguous assessment of nature's intertwining with culture is provided by Moira Gatens, who argues that there are determinate natural tendencies and forces upon which culture builds. 6 Although, for Gatens, these tendencies are culturally pliable, she suggests that the culture which modifies natural tendencies is always given determinate direction by natural forces in their initial form.
Gatens' approach promises to allow a more genuine interweaving of nature with culture, yet prompts several questions. How far must culture be independent of natural tendencies in order to modify them? If culture is independent of those tendencies, then how far do they ever really direct it?
Irigaray's later philosophy provides answers to these questions, suggesting that culture has agency vis-à-vis nature only because culture arises from an internal division Hölderlin, Irigaray argues that male nature tends to turn against itself, but that this tendency can be overcome through the very cultural resources which (male) nature generates in its selfdivision. 7 Thus, Irigaray advocates cultural change to transform nature's originally selfdestructive tendencies, but since she conceives culture as natural, she avoids reproducing the masculinism of the traditional culture/nature hierarchy. Her later thought can thus make a valuable contribution to feminist reflection on nature and culture by understanding cultural change as compatible with renewed recognition of, and esteem for, nature.
1. Nature and culture in Irigaray's Thinking the Difference
Irigaray does not explicitly set out her novel conception of the nature/culture relationship, but it is implicit in several of her later texts, most notably the essay 'A Chance to Live' in Irigaray goes on to claim that this masculine or patriarchal culture evinces a preoccupation with death and destruction while persistently neglecting, and failing to reflect upon, the primary importance for all human beings of their birth and dependency upon their 6 mothers in early infancy. 9 She then enumerates some further features of patriarchal cultureits suppression of mother-daughter relationships 10 and its tendency to deny women legal rights -but the fundamental task generated by her opening analysis is to explain in what way the destructiveness of western culture reflects its specifically masculine character. Her explanation unfolds in two stages.
Firstly, Irigaray suggests that patriarchal culture has its roots in the particular difficulties of male infants in negotiating separation from their mothers (separation in the dual sense of birth and of the gradual process of becoming independent and forming a separate sense of self). According to Irigaray, this process of separation is inescapably painful for all infants -she speaks of the 'the losses and scars involved in the separations from that first home … The wound we cannot heal, and cannot cure, is the cutting of the umbilical cord' (SG, 16). But, for boys, this separation is especially painful, because boys are overwhelmingly aware of their sexual difference from their mothers. In contrast, girls experience themselves as being of the same sex as their mothers -as Irigaray puts it:
'Woman … immediately becomes a subject in relation to another subject who is the same as Girls, then, can adapt to losing their mothers because they experience themselves as having the same corporeal abilities as their mothers, which ensures some continuity. Lacking this experience, boys must adopt a variety of coping strategies. Chief among these is to deny or disavow ever being dependent upon, or closely imbricated with, their mothers. This denial forces boys to disavow, in turn, their own corporeality, which bears testimony to dependency and finitude. Irigaray calls this whole strategy the 'murder' of the mother -not (usually) a literal murder, but an attitude of denying the mother's significance, and even existence, at a symbolic level. 12 Underneath this murderous attitude lingers a fantasy of fusion with and proximity to the mother, a fantasy which boys/men never relinquish (precisely because they never acknowledge it), and which surreptitiously invades and blights all their relations with women.
Irigaray's account of male difficulties in separating from the mother might be thought to rely on the implausible view that boys cannot tolerate separation from their mothers because they know that they will never be able to give birth (whereas girls know that they will be able to). This is implausible both because some girls will never be able to give birth and because young children are reasonably thought to lack knowledge of their future 8 reproductive abilities. However, Irigaray fundamentally understands the ability (and inability)
to give birth as functions of women's (and men's) distinctive rhythms, the distinctive temporal patterns which govern the development of their experience and capacities (TD, 114-115). 13 Thus, the sexual difference that boys experience is the difference between their rhythm and that of their mothers, where boys' particular rhythm structures and pervades their experience without them having any (conceptual) knowledge of what this rhythm is or signifies. If there genuinely are differences between sexuate rhythms as Irigaray believes, then it is plausible to think that boys will experience their own rhythm as different from that of their mothers, and that this experience must aggravate existing difficulties with separation.
Moreover, boys'/men's resultant strategy of symbolically murdering the mother can be expected to engender a destructive culture because, much of the time, boys/men will seek to negate and erase whatever is corporeal and natural. Boys/men will let this destructiveness persist unchecked because they remain trapped in a fantasy according to which the natural, corporeal, and (by association) maternal remains ever-present and indestructible (precisely that collective fantasy which Irigaray sees as threatened by the severity of the Chernobyl disaster).
Thinking the Difference offers an additional account of how western cultural destructiveness is masculine: this culture is rooted in male sexuality, which, Irigaray claims, obeys a different pattern to female sexuality, that of 'tension, release and return to homoeostasis' (TD, 21). She maintains that this sexuality impels men to engage in destructive modes of behaviour that seek to raise tensions to breaking point. Irigaray finds this reflected, especially, in modern technology, which (in its incessant noise, for example) intrudes disrespectfully upon the natural rhythms of human bodies. Notably, Irigaray's analysis of male sexuality implies that it generates practices and technologies which operate detrimentally to other elements of male embodiment. It appears that, for Irigaray, male corporeality turns against itself, some aspects of this corporeality perpetrating violence upon others.
Potentially problematically, Irigaray appears to assume that male sexuality has a determinate character independently of any cultural mediation. We should bear in mind, though, that Irigaray again regards male sexuality as a function of men's distinctive rhythm.
In this way, she understands sexual difference not primarily as biological but as a difference in men's and women's being -where being is not an entity, but the process of emergence of abilities, forms of experience, and anatomical structures, a process which differs between the sexes in respect of its temporal rhythm. 14 For Irigaray, this difference in sexuate being exists naturally. Following the later Heidegger, Irigaray thinks of being both as the event or process through which entities emerge, and as ultimately identical with nature (reconceived according to its original Greek definition as physis). 15 Irigaray does, therefore, believe in natural differences between men and women, existing prior to any cultural mediation. But this is not mere naïvety on her part, and involves no uncritical acceptance of the discourse of biology.
Rather, Irigaray believes in natural differences according to a distinctively philosophical reconception of nature. This philosophical reconception of nature informs her understanding of the nature/culture relationship in Thinking the Difference, which we can now begin to draw out.
Irigaray believes that male nature has generated a culture which opposes itself to nature, including to female bodies and to male bodies qua natural. There is, then, a part of nature -the male sex -which turns against itself. Western culture arises in this turning of (the male part of) nature against itself, thereby acquiring the enduring form of an anti-natural, ecologically damaging, culture. Irigaray's derivation of key features of western culture from male nature thus forms part of a careful attempt to avoid reifying culture as something independent of nature, and to understand culture, instead, as an internal torsion within the natural. This intriguing reconceptualisation of culture -and, concomitantly, of nature as selfopposing -remains only implicit in Irigaray's analysis of destructive culture in Thinking the Difference, but it becomes relatively explicit in To Be Two.
In the latter text, Irigaray opens her consideration of nature and culture by quoting the choral song from Sophocles' tragedy Antigone which begins (in the translation she uses):
'There is much that is uncanny, but nothing that surpasses man in uncanniness'. Hölderlin's speculations on this topic. 18 We can then explore how these speculations influence Heidegger, and how Irigaray eventually responds to both thinkers.
Hölderlin, nature, and the human
Hölderlin's thinking about nature arose in the context of early German Romanticism, which aspired to overcome the modern disenchantment of nature by producing art which would reinfuse nature with 'beauty, magic and mystery'. 19 Hölderlin became increasingly critical of this project of re-enchanting nature through art, which he came to find anthropocentric, presupposing the same separation between humanity and nature that it purported to overcome. Hölderlin's increasingly critical attitude to Romanticism reveals his deepening conviction that humanity's very separation from nature arises through a natural processhumanity being merely the site where nature turns against itself. This conviction of Hölderlin's becomes crucial for Heidegger and, in turn, Irigaray.
Hölderlin's thinking about humanity's status within nature represents the progressive working out of his early theoretical reflections on nature, especially those contained in his crucial early fragment 'Judgement and Being'. Here Hölderlin argues that all consciousness involves the subject relating to objects via judgement, through which it distinguishes these objects from itself. For Hölderlin, consciousness as a subject-object relation necessarily presupposes a prior unity of subject and object, a unity which is no mere synthesis but an absolute unification which precedes any distinction. This unity is, he states, 'Being [which]
expresses the combination of subject and object. Where subject and object are directly, not just partially, united, … there and nowhere else can there be talk of being as such'.
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However, this 'blessed unity, being' cannot be known. 21 We cannot be conscious of being, because all consciousness requires experience of objects from which we differentiate ourselves as subjects -a differentiation which is absent within being. Insofar as we are conscious, judging subjects, being is lost to us. Now, unitary being, Hölderlin also maintains, is nature. He equates original being with nature because he relies on the ancient Greek understanding of nature as physis, that which 'loves to hide'. 22 Because being is always disappearing, receding behind the separation between objects and subjects, being can be said to 'love to hide', and so can be identified with nature. As J. M. Bernstein sums up, 'nature as the ground of the human cannot appear because it would have to be judged, but if judged, then it is already in a state of dispersion'. 23 We can experience nature only as the realm of objects standing over against us, but cannot experience that prior nature which is united with us; as conscious, we have always already lost that originary nature. However, in drafting and redrafting his own tragedy The Death of Empedocles, Hölderlin came to identify two possible responses to separation from nature. The first, Greek, response -that of Empedocles -is to dissolve the self and die. The second response is the 'Hesperian', which defines western Europe after the decline of classical Greece, and which accepts the living death of separation from nature. 26 Hölderlin came to see the Hesperian response as more appropriate, finding the Greek attitude hubristic, premised on an inflated assessment of humanity's status within the cosmos. Hölderlin never systematically argues for the Hesperian response, but we can reconstruct why it becomes appropriate given the logic of his earlier thinking concerning nature.
If humanity is originally wholly one with nature, then their separation cannot arise from any activity on the part of humanity just as such. This separation must arise from nature, with which humanity is initially united. Nature must divide itself -into humanity on one side, and an objectified derivative of itself on the other. To construe ourselves, human beings, as responsible for this division is to presume our capacity to act independently of nature as a whole -when in fact, Hölderlin says, 'all the … streams of human activity … have their source in nature'. 27 From Hölderlin's perspective, then, it must be inappropriate for humanity to attempt to overcome separation (whether through suicide or artistic projects of reenchantment). To suppose that humanity can overcome separation is to assume that humanity can act independently of nature (so as to oppose the self-division which nature has initiated).
Even though all striving for unity is a striving to dissolve one's humanity, this striving remains, ultimately, premised upon anthropocentric assumptions. In fact, according to
Hölderlin's thinking, we have become separated from nature by its power alone, so it is not within our power to undo separation. 28 The appropriately modest response is to recognise our dependence and hence to endure separation -to wait, patiently, until nature may change its mode of being. Humanity, Hölderlin increasingly comes to believe, must undergo the suffering of division from nature.
Having previously positioned humanity as distinctly non-or anti-natural, Hölderlin increasingly draws out how nature persists within the non-naturalness of humanity. For
Hölderlin, humanity is non-natural just because it is the place where nature divides itself, splits within itself. The human condition of opposition to nature is inflicted upon humanity by nature. Hölderlin thus understands humanity as naturally non-natural, reciprocally conceiving nature as self-opposing, self-dividing. This understanding of humanity may be characterised as thoroughly non-anthropocentric, in that it traces even humanity's anti-natural, cultural, proclivities back to (self-dividing) nature. This thoroughly nonanthropocentric view of humanity becomes decisive for Heidegger and Irigaray.
Irigaray's response to Hölderlin and Heidegger
In his Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger comments on the choral ode to Sophocles'
Antigone while discussing the essence of the human. He aims to return to the original, ancient Greek, definition of human being, a poetic definition which he finds expressed in the writings of Heraclitus, Parmenides, and in Antigone. Heidegger takes as Antigone's central definition that humanity is to deinotaton, which he translates as the 'most uncanny' (Unheimlichste).
Humanity is singularly uncanny because it is the point at which nature (as physis) divides against itself. Although Heidegger does not mention Hölderlin at this point in the lecture course, Hölderlin's understanding of the human is evidently in the background -especially since Heidegger refers earlier to Hölderlin's unsurpassed understanding of 'the great age of Greek beginnings'. 29 Nonetheless, Heidegger departs from Hölderlin in giving central place to humanity's violence (Gewalt), as we will see.
Heidegger begins by exploring the Greek concept of deinon, translated as uncanny or terrible. Firstly, being or physis is uncanny because it is irreducible to beings (it is the event of their emergence which, preceding all beings, cannot be properly said to 'be'). Heidegger also describes being in its emergent, eruptive, character as violent, as the 'overwhelming sway' (überwältigende Walten). Humanity derives from physis and, as such, is violent too.
However, humanity is distinguished in being violent towards the rest of the beings that emerge physically: humanity (as Sophocles tells us) intrudes violently into sea and earth, forcibly tames and exploits animals, and, above all, masters beings as a whole by imposing intelligibility upon them. Humanity, then, is the place at which the violence of physis turns upon itself, which makes humanity the most uncanny. As Susan Schoenbohm explains Heidegger also stresses that humanity is destined to misunderstand its violent powers as manifesting its independent agency (when in fact, these powers are really powers of physis). In 'his' very resourcefulness and violence, the human being cannot but mistake 'the power which pervades him, which alone enables him to be a man' (IM, 156) for a power that 'he' has somehow brought about through his own resources. But because, in fact, humanity's power derives from physis, humanity is destined to be defeated by physis in its struggle He plows the earth and obliges it to produce by force what it does not yield on its own … Man imposes a yoke upon the life that unfolds in itself but whose foundations he does not inhabit' (TBT, 69). Man is the inquiétante being who breaks out of the nature to which he was originally enslaved and dominates it, instituting a second, cultural and historical, world (70). Following Heidegger, Irigaray adds that man becomes 'exiled' and 'estranged' from his being in this cultural world, inevitably coming to identify himself as the creator of this entire sphere, when, 'in fact, he has only imitated the strength of the universe which surrounds him … man's mastery resembles the natural strength with which he wishes to measure himself'.
His strength and violence are really that of nature, operating through him.
Besides paraphrasing Heidegger, Irigaray distances herself subtly from him (and, indirectly, from Hölderlin) by highlighting the sexually differentiated nature of the humanity through whom nature enacts violence upon itself. At first, she uses Heidegger's language of 'man' mimetically, but, as her essay unfolds, she marks increasingly firmly that male humanity is in question, not humans per se. Thus, she states that the violence of culture 'can be explained beginning from a masculine subjectivity' (TBT, 76). She also writes that:
The feminine is not called to carry out the task of constructing a world which is similar to man's: a violent, uncanny world, which exists through the domination of nature … To … cultivate herself without violence or power over what surrounds her -all of these correspond more to feminine being. (72) Irigaray suggests that men are violent due to their special difficulty in accepting sexual difference: 'man chooses to ignore this irreducible difference … Is this not because he feels foreign to this life which lives without him, this life which reproduces itself … ?' (70) Or, as she states later on, man's violence is 'probably related to man's relationship with the one who generates him: he will never generate in himself and must fabricate things outside of himself, in order to separate himself from the mother; he must manufacture externally, while she generates internally' (76). For Irigaray (drawing on her earlier analysis in Thinking the Difference), it is men's difficulty in accepting sexual difference which leads them to turn against women, and, simultaneously, against the nature of which they themselves are partas when men engineer technologies which damage their own nature. Irigaray's apparently contradictory statements regarding the contributions of nature and culture to male violence can be reconciled if she believes that men have only a natural tendency to violence. If so, then male violence is not inevitable, because men's destructive tendency will be activated or exercised only if a set of appropriate conditions is met.
While Irigaray agrees with
Moreover, contextual factors invariably affect how any tendency exercises itself, so that its manifestation is always socially and culturally mediated, in complex, unpredictable, ways.
Thus, Irigaray need not envisage a linear causal relationship between masculine violence and a destructive culture. Rather, men's violent tendencies will become activated in the absence of a sexuate culture, an absence which leaves men without resources to comprehend and acclimatise to sexual difference. The little boy finds himself in a space of unfathomable mystery only because his culture, which is non-sexuate, deprives him of ways to make sense of his mother's difference from himself. If femininity were instead recognised as an independent identity, and masculinity were recognised as a correspondingly specific identity with virtues and values of its own, then the difficulty of sexual difference would become negotiable.
Yet how can culture, which is only the effect of nature's tendency to turn against itself, ever affect the natural tendency from which it results? Irigaray's answer is that culture arises as something genuinely non-natural through nature's turn against itself, a nonnaturalness that enables culture to act back upon the nature that sustains it. Here Irigaray denies that she is falling back onto the traditional idea that culture is independent of naturefor her, the anti-naturalness of culture itself arises naturally. Moreover, she also insists that a sexuate culture would not oppose nature's self-opposing tendencies altogether (which would, after all, be self-contradictory, for then this culture would effectively cancel itself out).
Rather, a sexuate culture would cultivate natural tendencies -transforming them and orienting them in a new, relatively benign, direction. In particular, this culture would redirect men's oppositional tendencies -their 'negativity' -against themselves, so as to install within them a permanent check against their own destructiveness, and a stimulant to respect for the other and for nature. 33 For Irigaray, then, the violent, anti-natural, character of western culture has arisen through our own -cultural -failure to redirect nature's tendency to turn against itself. A sexuate culture could counteract this tendency and push it towards a new respect for alterity.
Whereas Hölderlin counsels us to wait patiently for possible change in nature's own mode of being, Irigaray urges that we -as human, cultural, beings -should intervene to reorientate nature's self-destructive tendency. In these divergent recommendations, Hölderlin and
Irigaray might at first sight appear to occupy the two poles of the dilemma with which I opened this paper, over whether or not we should affirm that culture has natural foundations.
Hölderlin denies culture any independence of nature, but consequently espouses quietism.
Irigaray advocates cultural change, but would therefore seem obliged to grant culture some independent agency with respect to nature. Yet she avoids making that move: although she allows culture the agency to transform and cultivate nature, she does so without conceiving culture as independent of nature, instead reconceiving it as dependent on nature for its agency. This agency arises naturally, through internal division within nature. Irigaray treats nature as the ontologically basic element within the culture/nature dyad, distancing herself from the masculinist tradition which typically devalues nature, depicting it as secondary to the cultural, spiritual, realm. Irigaray thereby succeeds in combining a consistent refusal of the masculinist nature/culture hierarchy with advocacy of cultural change. Her thought thus dissolves feminist philosophy's dilemma, opening up a way for feminists to combine support for cultural change with commitment to securing renewed recognition and esteem for nature.
In highlighting these unique strengths of Irigaray's philosophy of sexual difference, I
do not mean to suggest that it is without problems. Her conception of the nature/culture relation relies on her belief in natural sexual difference, which she regards as fundamentally real in a way that racial and ethnic differences are not (ILTY, 47). Her understanding of natural sexual difference is also, arguably, heteronormative, implying a natural attraction between the two sexes. 34 Nonetheless, I believe that these problems could be most productively addressed by starting from and transforming, rather than rejecting, Irigaray's fruitful conception of the nature/culture relation. I hope that this paper has shown that this conception is sufficiently original and important to deserve such further elaboration and transformation. 
